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ABSTRACT 
Mary Elizabeth Walters; New Military Humanitarians: Competition and Cooperation between 
NATO and Humanitarian Agencies in 1999 Kosovar Refugee Assistance in 1999 
(Under the direction of Wayne Lee) 
 
 Within the larger context of Serbian ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 
1999, a complex relationship developed between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations 
as they responded to the unexpected magnitude of the Kosovar refugee crisis. For the first time 
in NATO’s 50-year history, the military organization took action in alleviating a humanitarian 
disaster. Civilian humanitarian organizations, rather than being in the lead, took a backseat to 
NATO military planning. NATO’s soldiers, meanwhile, were on the frontlines not of battle, but 
of providing humanitarian assistance to Kosovar refugees. NATO and civilian humanitarian 
organizations, including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, both competed and 
cooperated in their ad hoc efforts to establish refugee camps in Albania as the international 
media scrutinized the situation. Competition for funding and resources between NATO and 
civilian humanitarian organizations shaped and limited efforts at cooperation across a wide range 
of Kosovar refugee assistance efforts.  
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New Military Humanitarians: Competition and Cooperation between NATO and 
Humanitarian Agencies in Kosovar Refugee Assistance in 1999 
 
Introduction 
 Hundreds of large, drab, army green tents stretched across a field in neat rows and 
columns, each tent meticulously spaced from the next. At regular intervals larger thoroughfares 
intersected the endless march of tents, creating an unforgiving grid of canvas and humanity. 
Smartly dressed soldiers moved purposefully through the camp, setting up more tents and 
repairing continual drainage problems. Kosovar refugees looked on uncertainly, still not sure if 
their new security would be jerked out from under them. Two heavily armed gates guarded the 
entrance to the temporary city with men in bulky vests and helmets watching for threats. Not that 
far away, another tent city sprang up. This one, while still highly structured, had smaller, bright 
white tents organized in small clusters. Broad paths connected the clusters to each other. Harried 
civilian aid workers in jeans and rumpled shirts met with elected Kosovar refugee leaders from 
each cluster of tents, determining policies and priorities. In Albania, NATO and civilian 
humanitarian organizations clashed over how to build these temporary tent cities and broader 
aspects of responding to the 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis. For the first time in NATO’s 50-year 
history, the military organization took action in alleviating a humanitarian disaster. NATO’s 
prominent role in responding to the 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis inverted ‘traditional’ military 
and civilian roles. Civilian humanitarian organizations, rather than being in the lead, took a 
backseat to NATO military planning. NATO’s soldiers, meanwhile, were on the frontlines not of 
battle, but of providing humanitarian assistance to Kosovar refugees. 
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 Within a larger story of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, was woven a complex and changing 
relationship between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations as the international 
community responded to the unexpected waves of Kosovar refugees between March and June 
1999. NATO and the humanitarian organizations, such as the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), both 
competed and cooperated in their ad hoc efforts to establish refugee camps in Albania and the 
ultimate transition from military-led to civilian-led refugee assistance. Although the Kosovar 
refugee crisis extended into three neighboring countries, this study focuses on competition and 
cooperation in Albania, where the ethnic and cultural similarities of Albanians and the Kosovar 
refugees simplifies the story relative to the refugee relief efforts in Macedonia and Montenegro. 
The unanticipated magnitude of the refugee crisis starting in March 1999 caught the international 
community off guard and left civilian humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR, who would 
usually manage refugee crises, unable to do so. With hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees 
in need of immediate assistance and the international media scrutinizing the situation, NATO 
filled the assistance vacuum. Competition for scarce funding and resources between NATO and 
civilian humanitarian organizations shaped and limited efforts at cooperation across a wide range 
of Kosovar refugee assistance efforts, such as the construction and management of refugee 
camps. 
 The 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis was part of the larger story of the death throes of the 
former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The earlier conflicts in Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Croatia crucially shaped the expectations and actions of Serbia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, ethnic Serbs, Kosovars, and the international community, including NATO. Like the 
wars in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia, ethnic cleansing characterized the conflict in Kosovo. 
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Over the course of 1998, ethnic violence in Kosovo steadily increased, as did international 
concern and diplomatic efforts. In early 1999, the violence peaked with several widely reported 
Serbian massacres of Albanian Kosovars, the most obvious symptom of a broader campaign of 
ethnic cleansing.1 In this context, the Contact Group, made up of France, Russia, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, attempted a final diplomatic solution in Rambouillet, 
France. When these talks collapsed, NATO launched Operation Allied Force on March 24.2 
Although Operation Allied Force was envisioned as a three-day bombing campaign, it lasted 78 
days, only ending on June 10. Out Kosovo’s population of roughly two million, over 800,000 
Albanian Kosovars had fled into Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Another 550,000 
Kosovars became internally displaced persons within Kosovo.3 
 The refugee crisis itself, the influence it exerted over broader events surrounding Kosovo 
in 1999, and its continuing impact remain little understood. There are several reasons for this 
including the recentness of the event, the event lying at an odd gap in the relevant academic 
fields, and the truly global dynamic of the conflict. Ethnic Albanian refugees fled from the 
Serbian region of Kosovo into Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Some of these refugees 
were then flown around the world to countries as far away as Australia.4 In addition, a daunting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Kosovo/ Kosova As Seen As Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings 
of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999, vol. I (Warsaw: Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, 1999), 10. 
 
2 Dana H. Allin, NATO’s Balkan Interventions, Adelphi Paper 347 (Oxford University Press for The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 55. 
 
3 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Kosovo: One Year After 
the Bombing, 106th Cong., June 8, 2000, 6. 
 
4 In 1999, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro were republics within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. In addition, I have used “Macedonia” as a short hand for the Republic of Macedonia. In many official 
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number of international organizations and NGOs converged on Kosovo and the surrounding 
area, not to mention the nineteen member-states of NATO who were intimately involved in the 
conflict. If this were not enough complexity, the initial wave(s) of ethnic Albanian refugees, or 
Kosovar refugees, which fled Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, were later replaced with ethnic Serb and 
Roma refugees, an issue outside the scope of this thesis. 
 Closely related to these issues is the challenge of sources. For example, NATO has a very 
strict 30-year minimum release policy for its archives. Similar release problems exist for most 
government archives. Despite this apparent lack of sources, in reality there is actually an 
abundance of source material. NATO, it’s member-states, the various agencies and military 
branches of each NATO-member states gave regular press briefing and published reporting of 
their humanitarian actions. Civilian humanitarian organizations, as well as human rights 
organizations, published frequent reports on the state of the crisis and the actions, and their 
effectiveness, taken by individual organizations. Civilian humanitarian organizations’ archives 
are also frequently more open, for example the archives of the provided particularly rich sources. 
The danger of many of these sources is that there is a preponderance of civilian sources, and 
therefore perceptions, over those of NATO and NATO’s military components. There are 
exceptions, however. The UNHCR after action reporting, for example, was marked by 
organizational soul-searching and the reports bluntly stated their own organization’s 
shortcomings and its reliance on NATO in key aspects. Thus, as with any historical undertaking, 
disparate and self-interested sources can be woven together to form a semblance of the past. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NATO and UN documents, Macedonia is referred to as the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) as 
a result of an ongoing naming dispute with Greece. 
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Historiography 
 The events in Kosovo remain too recent to have garnered significant historical attention, 
and there is virtually none on the refugee aspect.5 More surprising is the lack of historical work 
on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in general. Both sit at an odd intersection of 
historical subfields. Diplomatic historians have examined the high politics of the negotiations 
and peace agreements that either precede most peacekeeping missions or follow on the heels of 
their deployment.6 Similarly, historians of international law have thoroughly explored the 
evolving legal frameworks of peacekeeping. 7 Meanwhile, historians of human rights have 
written on the human rights crises that frequently coincide with peacekeeping missions and often 
provide the foundational rationale for missions.8 In contrast, few military historians have looked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Despite a lack of historical work on the 1999 crisis in Kosovo in particular, there is a valuable body of research on 
the history of Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Particularly important works include: Ivo Banac, The National Question 
in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); James Gow, The Serbian Project 
and Its Adversaries: a Strategy of War Crimes (London: C. Hurst, 2002); Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a 
Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New 
York: New York University Press, 1999); Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and 
Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Marii͡ a Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 
Updated ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
6 See: James Gow, The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997); Cameron R. Hume, “Negotiations Before Peacekeeping,” Occasional Papers on 
Peacekeeping 5 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1991). 
 
7 F.M. Deng, S. Kimaro, T. Lyons, D. Rothchild, and I.W. Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict 
Management in Africa (Washington: Brookings Institution 1996); Jack Donnelly, “State Sovereignty and 
International Intervention: The Case of Human Rights,” in Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention, edited by Gene Martin Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995); F.H. Hinsley, “The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States,” in Defense of Sovereignty, 
edited by W. J Stankiewicz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Stephan D. Krasner, “Sovereignty and 
Intervention,” in Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention, edited by Gene Martin 
Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
 
8 See: Gerard Prunier, Darfur: a 21st Century Genocide, Third Edition, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); 
Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 1998). 
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at peacekeeping because few peacekeeping operations before the 1990s corresponded with 
conceptions of what the military ought to be doing or what the field of military history should 
cover.9 In contrast, NATO’s bombing campaign has been extensively studied by military 
historians interested in the role of air power and strategic bombing.10 
 NATO’s transition to military humanitarianism in responding to the Kosovar refugee 
crisis, however, fits into a larger historiographical discussion on the nature of western militaries, 
or the existence of a “western way of war.” The uniting theme in this discussion is the belief that 
culture matters. Russell Weigley argues that “what we believe and what we do today is governed 
at least as much by the habits of mind we formed in the relatively remote past as by what we did 
and thought yesterday.”11 As Wayne Lee observes, “machine guns may kill, but ideas decide 
where to place them, how to man them, and when the most effective moment is to begin firing 
them.”12 In the same manner, culturally informed ideas shape when to restrain from the use of 
force, how to interact with civilians in war zones, and whether to deliver humanitarian assistance 
to refugees. NATO’s humanitarian assistance efforts in Albania raise particular questions about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The exceptions to this tend to focus around peacekeeping missions that involved significant fighting to were 
identified more as interventions than peacekeeping operations. See: Philippe Girard, Clinton in Haiti: the 1994 U.S. 
Invasion of Haiti (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations since 1945: 
Peacekeeping and the Cold War (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1999). 
 
10 See: A. J Bacevich and Eliot A Cohen, eds., War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001); Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the great air power 
debate,” in Strategic Studies: A Reader, edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (London: Routledge, 
2008); Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Arlington: 
RAND, 2001); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007); 
John Stone, “Air-power, Land-power and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict,” Civil Wars 2: 3 (1996), 26-42; Larry K. 
Wentz, ed., Lessons from Kosovo: KFOR Experience (Department of Defence Command and Control Research 
Program, 2002). 
 
11 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), xx. 
 
12 Wayne Lee, “Warfare and Culture,” in Warfare and Culture in World History ed. Wayne Lee (New York: New 
York University Press, 2011), 1. 
 	   7 
the purpose and appropriate roles of western militaries. This historiography briefly examines the 
literature on the western way of war and the related field of the American way of war, focusing 
on historic and academic conceptions on military roles. 
 Although not lacking in detractors, the “Western way of war” thesis proposed by Victor 
Davis Hanson has profoundly influenced the field of military history, as well as branches of 
security studies, policy, and the American military. As John Lynn notes, current work “on war 
and culture…cannot avoid Hanson’s thesis.”13 Hanson first articulated his idea in 1989 in The 
Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece and he further elaborated it in Carnage 
and Culture in 2002. Hanson argues, “throughout the long evolution of Western warfare there 
has existed a more or less common core of practices” that originated in ancient Greek hoplite 
infantry battle.14 While Hanson identifies a host of characteristics, such as civic militarism, 
individualism, discipline, morale, and command, the “preeminent characteristic,” however, is the 
quest for decisive battle.15 Therefore, according to Hanson, the Western way of war emphasizes 
“annihilation…head-to-head battle that destroys the enemy” in a quick and decisive manner.16 
 Building upon Hanson’s version of the Western way of war, Geoffrey Parker merges the 
concept of a Western way of war with the older historiographical debate on the rise of the West. 
In his earlier work on the rise of the West and the Western military revolution, Parker described 
the aim of this branch of literature as identifying how Europe, “initially so small and so deficient 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 13. 
 
14 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, 1st Anchor Books 
ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 24. 
 
15 Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 21; Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical 
Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 
 
16 Hanson, Carnage and Culture, 22. 
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in most natural resources,” was able to rise to global political, economic, and military power.17 
Later, Parker added the Western way of war to his explanation of the rise of the West. In 
particular, Parker focuses on the destructiveness of Western militaries. Beyond a continuous 
tactical emphasis on infantry, Parker argues, “western strategy, whether by battle, siege, or 
attrition, almost always remained the total defeat and destruction of the enemy.”18 According to 
Parker, this tradition of destruction combined with an emphasis on technology, discipline, 
surprise, and economic strength create a western way of war that helps to explain the rise of the 
West.19 
 Although Hanson gained the support of some prominent military historians, he also has 
equally prominent detractors. John Lynn’s Battle is particularly scathing of “Hanson’s thesis.” 
Lynn argues that its “most fundamental assertions,” that the western way of war “has maintained 
a continuity from the Greeks to the present day and its assertion that Western military practices 
are, in fact, unique” are untenable.20 While Lynn does not deny the importance of “the constant 
availability of military literature from ancient Greece and Rome,” he argues “this literature did 
not necessarily act as an agent of the Western Way of War.”21 In fact, many of these classic 
writings ran counter to the premises of the western way of war. Despite these misgivings, Lynn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge  ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4. 
 
18 Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3, 5, 364, 365, 367.  
 
19 Parker, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, 3. 
 
20 Lynn, Battle, 13, 15. 
 
21 Lynn, Battle, 23. 
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identifies a return to principles derived from the classical period at the end of the eighteenth 
century that continues to shape western militaries.22 
 Related to this debate is the discussion over the American way of war. Although work on 
the American way of war predates Hanson’s thesis, the concept of a western way of war 
continues to exert a significant influence and in many ways merged with aspects of Hanson’s 
ideas; indeed in Adrian Lewis’s estimation, “the American way of war is an outgrowth of the 
Western Way of War.”23 Russell Weigley launched the discussion of an American way of war in 
1973. In a book that has become a “touchstone” of American military history, Weigley argues 
that not only does America have a unique way of war, but that since the Civil War “annihilation 
became characteristically the American way in war.”24 Furthermore, the American conception of 
strategy until the Korean war was extremely narrow. In fact, Weigley argues American 
conceptions of strategy even “excluded from consideration the purposes for which a battle or a 
war was being fought, military strategists gave little regard to the non-military consequences of 
what they were doing.”25 Although the advent of the Cold War and nuclear weapons forced the 
enlargement of military strategy to include a broader range of issues, the older tradition of a 
limited conception of strategy remained powerful, and powerfully limiting, in the American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Lynn, Battle, 15. 
 
23 Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation 
Enduring Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2012), 14. 
 
24 Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter-Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the 
Field,” The Journal of American History 93:4 (March 1, 2007), 1120; Weigley, The American Way of War, xxii. 
 
25 Weigley, The American Way of War, xviii. 
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military establishment.26 Throughout Weigley’s narrative, the primary focus of the American 
way of war is achieving military victory, resulting in a narrow vision of the military’s purpose 
and relegating any roles not directly contributing to victory in conventional battle secondary. 
 Unsurprisingly, since 1973 there have been many modifications and challenges to 
Weigley’s conception of the American way of war. Some historians have sought to prove or 
disprove the American way of war through specific case studies, but of more interest here are 
attempts to update or challenge Weigley’s work through new sweeping accounts.27 Adrian 
Lewis, for example, heavily influenced by American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, argues 
that in the American way of war, the aim of war is “the destruction of the enemy's main army, 
followed by the occupation of the country; and finally, the transformation of the defeated 
national politically, economically, socially, and, ultimately, culturally.”28 Lewis dismisses 
military operations other than war, such as peacekeeping, in one paragraph as peripheral to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Weigley, The American Way of War:, 365-368. 
 
27 For an overview of some of the literature spawned by Weigley’s work see: Brian M. Linn, “The American Way of 
War Revisited,” Journal of Military History 66, no. 2 (April 2002): 501–533; and Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter-
Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field,” The Journal of American History 
93:4 (March 1, 2007): 1116–1142. Two periods that have received significant attention in relation to the American 
way of war are the colonial period and the Civil War. For the colonial period see: Guy Chet, Conquering the 
American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in Colonial Northeast (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003); John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-
1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Wayne E. Lee, “Early American Ways of War: A New 
Reconnaissance, 1600-1815,” Historical Journal 44 (March 2001): 269–289; Patrick Malone, The Skulking Way of 
War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians (Lanham: National Book Network, 1991); 
Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1998); Ian Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For the Civil 
War see: Gary Gallagher, Lee & His Army in Confederate History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001); Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh 
Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1991). 
 
28 Lewis, The American Culture of War, 26. 
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military’s primary warfighting purpose.29 In a similar vein, in an article on the United States Air 
Force Grant Hammond admits that anything less than “boots on the ground…may be an 
intervention, but not a ‘real’ war.”30 Weigley’s American way of war has also influenced other 
fields, such as security studies. Colin Gray, for example, adopts much of Weigley’s argument in 
reformulating the American way of war. Gray, like Weigley, argues, “The American way, in 
effect, is to treat warfare as a near autonomous activity, all but separate from its political 
purposes and consequences.”31 Additionally, the American way of war is impatient, expecting 
quick and decisive results.32 
 Other historians, such as Antulio Echevarria and Brian Linn, have problematized 
Weigley’s thesis without completely rejecting it. Echevarria argues that the characteristics 
Weigley and others have described are not a way of war, but a way of battle. He explains that 
both practitioners’ and academics’ “concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of 
battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success, and 
hence was more a way of battle than an actual way of war.”33 Nevertheless, Echevarria accepts 
Weigleys’ characteristics as accurately describing the way the American military fights. In 
contrast, Brian Linn argues that Weigley’s thesis fails to capture the complexity of the American 
way of war and that Weigley’s emphasis on annihilation can be too easily confused with the 	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broader military ideal of a quick victory.34 Focusing on the United States Army, Linn provides 
an alternate conception of the American way of war. He identifies three intellectual traditions, 
which he terms Guardians, Heroes, and Managers, that compete for dominance. Guardians view 
war as both an art and a science, viewing war as an “engineering project.”35 Heroes are more 
interested in the “human element” and their conception of war as “simply battle” most closely 
fits the broader literature on the American way of war.36 Finally, Managers emerged in the later 
part of the nineteenth century and view war as requiring “the mobilization of the entire nation.” 
Importantly, Linn observes that, “their fixation on future wars made this group indifferent to 
small outbreaks of violence, postconflict operations, and unconventional missions.”37 Although 
Echevarria and Linn conceptualize the American way of war very differently, they have one 
important commonality that is also shared by the bulk of the literature on the American way of 
war: the dismissal of limited conflicts, such as peacekeeping, as a significant area of concern for 
American military practitioners, thinkers, and even historians. 
 The most significant exception to the focus on conventional warfare in the American way 
of war literature comes from outside of professional history. In 2002 Max Boot, a former 
journalist at the Wall Street Journal and currently a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, published The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. 
Boot argues that while the traditional American way of war that “annihilates the enemy” exists, 
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there is also a “less celebrated tradition in U.S. military history - a tradition of fighting small 
wars.”38 Boot traces the long tradition of the American military fighting small wars, such as wars 
against Native Americans in the west, marine expeditions, and naval gunboat diplomacy. Despite 
this long tradition, Boot argues that the American military developed a type of amnesia in 
regards to these experiences, insisting that they were instead “temporary diversion[s] from their 
‘real’ job – preparing to fight a conventional army” or navy.39 Even the Marine Corps, which 
Boot points out were known as “State Department troops: in the early twentieth century, 
abandoned their Small Wars Manual in preference for “the greater glory of major wars.”40 Boot, 
however, fails to develop his argument to its full potential, ignoring the development and 
humanitarian tasks that often accompanied these savage wars of peace. 
 There remain two final historical works worth considering, although both address small 
niches in the broader topic of the American way of war. Tony Mullis adds to Boots conception of 
an alternate American way of war by arguing that the so called new missions of the 1990s, in 
particular peacekeeping, in fact had a long precedent in the American military tradition. Mullis 
argues that if peacekeeping “is defined as the use of military force to maintain peace and order” 
either through the “interposition of armed soldiers between hostile factions” or the use of 
military force or its threat, then many of the “constabulary duties” of the Army qualify as 
peacekeeping. In particular, Mullis points to Army operations against the Sioux in 1855 and in 
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pacification efforts following the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854.41 One of the central themes of 
Mullis’s study is that the circumstances of Army operations against the Sioux, within the Kansas 
Territory, and in other constabulary missions “required the army to conduct operations it was 
often loathe and ill-trained to perform – peacekeeping and peacemaking.”42 Mullis broadens the 
role of the military from fighting and winning conventional battles, to the complex tasks 
associated with peacekeeping that fail to fit nicely into warfighting. 
 Frank Schubert further broadens the role of the American military in his short study, 
Other than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War 
Decade. Schubert argues, “Much of the American military tradition is a study in dualities” 
between major wars against foreign armies and gendarme or constabulary actions. In fact, 
according to Schubert, despite the overwhelming focus on the first category, the vast majority of 
army, navy, and marine operations were actually gendarme operations. Rather than gendarme 
operations distracting the American military from major wars, Schubert presents the Spanish-
American War and the First World War as breaks with the more common gendarme missions.43 
Like Boot, Schubert admits that there is an equally long tradition of American servicemen 
disliking gendarme tasks, particularly following the Civil War.44 Instead of the American 
military being best suited to fighting wars, Schubert argues that the American military has an 
equally long tradition of “peace operations, nationbuilding, humanitarian work, and law 	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enforcement.”45 In this light, NATO’s Kosovar refugee assistance efforts in Albania, and the 
significant role played by the United States, were not something revolutionary and new, but part 
of a long, if often overlooked, tradition in the American way of war. 
 Although the United States military, and as a result much of NATO’s military leadership, 
entered the Kosovo NATO’s military humanitarianism was not without problems, NATO 
succeeded in meeting Kosovar refugees’ most basic needs. NATO troops adapted to the new 
environment, built refugee camps, and supported civilian humanitarian agencies broader efforts 
through infrastructure projects and the logistical network NATO established. These successes 
challenge assumptions in the historiography on the western and American way of war that 
western militaries are geared toward decisive battle. Instead, NATO’s actions in Albania indicate 
that, at the very least, the American way of war is broad enough to include operations other than 
war, despite their frequent neglect. 
 
The Path to NATO’s Military Humanitarianism 
 As the situation leading up to the crisis in 1999 gradually worsened, NATO and its 
member-states created a discourse of humanitarianism and human rights as the groundwork for 
possible military intervention. In January 1999, for example, NATO Secretary General Javier 
Solana unequivocally outlined the objectives of any future NATO military campaign in Kosovo: 
First, to help prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused by refugees and displaced 
persons fleeing the violence - a catastrophe that we narrowly averted last autumn. 
Second, to help to protect the human and civil rights of the people of Kosovo; and 
third to help to achieve a political settlement for Kosovo based on a large measure 
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of autonomy for this region within the frontiers of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.46  
The rhetoric of Solana and leaders from NATO member-states placed the commitment to human 
rights at the heart of NATO’s public legitimization for military action against Serbia. As Robert 
Sherwood, one of Franklin Roosevelt’s speechwriters, observed during World War II, “when you 
state a moral principle, you are stuck with it, no matter how many fingers you have kept crossed 
at the moment.”47 Sherwood’s observation proved telling over fifty years later as NATO's very 
public rhetorical commitment to humanitarian principles cast a long shadow over the conduct of 
NATO's military intervention following the collapse of peace talks in 1999. Having publicly and 
repeatedly based the legitimacy of their military intervention on humanitarian grounds, NATO 
was forced to live up to those high ideals. This dynamic not only took shape in the bombing 
campaign itself, but also in the leading role NATO reluctantly took in providing assistance to the 
thousands of Kosovar refugees fleeing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. As the 
refugee crisis only got worse, and critics blamed NATO bombing rather than Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milošević, NATO increased its involvement in Kosovar refugee 
assistance. 
 The origins of the conflict are complex, as was NATO’s path to intervention. Colin 
Powell famously argued that the 1990s wars in the Balkans resulted from “an ethnic tangle with 
roots reaching back a thousand years.”48 This widespread perception of the region and its 
difficulties paints too broad a brush. It is true, however, that both Serbs and Albanians have 	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constructed a narrative of ancient conflict to justify their fighting during the First and Second 
Balkan Wars, both World Wars, and the vicious reprisals that have recurred during every shift in 
power. Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians in 1998-1999 was the latest occurrence in 
this pattern of violence. After the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina, especially after the 
failure of UN peacekeepers to halt the killing of over 7,000 Bosniak men and boys in the 
Srebrenica safe area, the international community was keen to avoid a repeat in Kosovo. Media 
coverage of the massacre of 85 Kosovar civilians by Serbian paramilitary forces, combined with 
the more general increase in Serbian violence against Kosovars, triggered the demand by the 
Contact Group  that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milošević agree to a 
ceasefire or face an arms embargo and various other political and economic sanctions.49 U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright warned at a Contact Group meeting, “History is watching 
us. In this very room our predecessors delayed as Bosnia burned, and history will not be kind to 
us if we do the same.”50 Albright’s warning reveals not only the desire to avoid a repeat of the 
mistakes of the past, but the importance of humanitarian concerns, and issues of legitimacy tied 
to upholding humanitarian rights, in Western rhetoric on Kosovo. 
 Kosovar refugees were already becoming a serious concern by mid-1998. In July, over 
14,000 Kosovar refugees were registered in northern Albania and another 80,000 were internally 	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displaced persons within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.51 By October, humanitarian 
agencies warned that unless action was taken many refugees and internally displaced persons 
would not make it through the winter due to lack of adequate shelter.52 With these worries in 
mind, Dayton Accords veteran diplomat Richard Holbrook negotiated an agreement with 
Milošević on 16 October, which provided for the cessation of attacks on civilians, the withdrawal 
of some Serbian forces, granting of access to humanitarian agencies, allowing refugees to return, 
and the creation of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo 
Verification Mission.53 This Holbrooke-Milošević agreement postponed the worst of the 
violence and was instrumental in helping up to 50,000 internally displaced persons survive the 
winter.54  
 The agreement proved to be even more temporary than expected, however, and on 19 
December, Serbia launched a new offensive in Kosovo.55 The operation was spearheaded by the 
Armed Forces of Yugoslavia and aimed to re-occupy supply routes held by the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), sparking a widespread cycle of KLA and Serbian56 retaliatory attacks 
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and kidnappings.57 In particular, reporters covered an incident in which Serbian forces massacred 
forty-five Kosovar civilians at Račak on January 15, 1999.58 With the pressure of public opinion 
rising, the United States National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee met on January 
16. The meeting focused on the implications of the deaths at Račak, including the need for a 
Presidential statement condemning the massacre, using it to renew pressure upon Milosević, and 
even dispatching General Wesley Clark to Belgrade to “impress upon President Milosević the 
gravity of the situation.”59 Finally, on March 20, 1999, widespread Serbian ethnic cleansing of 
ethnic Albanians reached critical levels and forced the evacuation of the OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission.60  
 The final diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group to end the violence culminated with the 
Rambouillet Talks.61 The Rambouillet Agreement would have established the framework for 
“democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Under the Agreement, Kosovo would govern its own 
internal affairs, including legislative, while FRY maintained “competence” over the territorial 
integrity of Kosovo, monetary policy, defense, foreign policy, customs, federal taxation, and 
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federal elections.62 On 18 March, the Kosovar delegation signed the agreement under pressure 
from the United States. The Yugoslav delegation, however, refused.63  
 With the failure of Rambouillet and resting on the rhetorical foundations of 
humanitarianism and human rights built over the previous year, NATO launched Operation 
Allied Force. From the beginning, NATO used the protection of human rights to legitimize the 
bombing campaign. President Clinton told the American public that America and the world had a 
“moral imperative” to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians and that only “firmness 
can stop armies and save lives.”64 Similarly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued, “For 
these poor, defenceless people we are the only chance they have got.”65  
 NATO envisioned Operation Allied Force as a three-day bombing campaign that would 
quickly cause Milošević to acquiesce to NATO’s demands. This vision was strongly rooted in 
NATO's 1995 bombing experiences in Bosnia, where NATO launched its first bombing 
campaign, Operation Deliberate Force. Although it only lasted a little over two weeks, Operation 
Deliberate Force is generally believed to have been an important factor in bringing Serbian 
forces to the negotiating table, resulting in the Dayton Agreement.66 The presumed speed of the 
operation therefore obviated the fact that the bombing would not directly address the ongoing 	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ethnic cleansing of Kosovars, the purported reason for NATO's intervention.67 When the initial 
days of bombing failed to coerce Milošević to concede, NATO transitioned to a prolonged, 
escalatory bombing campaign designed to gradually increase pressure on Milošević.68 This type 
of bombing campaign, however, was poorly suited to stopping ethnic cleansing. Milošević could 
disperse his troops into the general population, making it impossible for NATO to bomb them 
without unacceptable civilian casualties while still maintaining full operational capacity.69  
 Further complicating matters for NATO, Milošević accelerated the pace of Operation 
Horseshoe, “a controlled near-encirclement, designed to force Kosovars inside the ‘horseshoe’ to 
exit in one particular direction” out of Kosovo.70 At first Operation Horseshoe concentrated on 
"securing a wide corridor for the introduction of more forces into the province" in the Drenica 
region where the KLA had strongholds, and in the broad stretch of southwest Kosovo near the 
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Albanian border. By doing so the Serbians funneled displaced Kosovars out of Kosovo 
entirely.71  
 Operation Horseshoe, and more importantly the manner in which it was depicted by the 
media, shaped the conduct of Operation Allied Force and contributed to NATO's need to be seen 
doing humanitarian work in the refugee camps. Operation Horseshoe put NATO in a difficult 
bind. While the organization’s public rhetoric emphasized ending the Serbian violence against 
the Kosovars and ameliorating the suffering of Kosovar civilians, humanitarian issues were 
relegated to the periphery of the strategy underlying Operation Allied Force. General Wesley 
Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, captured the crux of the uneasy 
relationship between humanitarianism and Operation Allied Force itself in an interview with 
CNN on March 26. He noted, “It was always understood from the outset that there was no way 
we were going to stop these paramilitary forces who were going in there and murdering 
civilians.”72 Even the Department of Defense’s 2000 report to Congress admits that Operation 
Allied Force struggled to effectively stop Serbian units committing ethnic cleansing. “The 
Serbian forces conducted an extensive strategic, tactical, and operational-level denial and 
deception campaign,” making it difficult for NATO planes to locate and destroy Serbian units 
and air defenses.73 Meanwhile, Serbian forces continued to force ethnic Albanians from their 
homes and out of Kosovo. 
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 Having staked the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention on improving the Kosovars’ 
humanitarian situation, images of refugees’ extreme suffering and degradation threatened to 
undermine Operation Allied Force’s already precarious legitimacy and international support.74 
Reflecting on the crisis in August 1999, the UNHCR reported that the situation in Kosovo was 
unique from the other crises the UNHCR had faced up to that point due to the unprecedented 
coverage by television media, which “brought the crisis more to the consciousness of the citizens 
of the major donor countries.”75 Analyst Lawrence Freedman argues the CNN effect played a 
critical role in prompting and dictating NATO action in Kosovo.76 This version of the CNN 
effect argues that widespread media coverage of human suffering can arouse the public opinion 	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of democracies to pressure their governments to intervene. Freedman goes so far as to argue that 
NATO’s humanitarian rhetoric led to dangerously high public expectations concerning the speed 
by which the bombing campaign would succeed, not only militarily but also in relation to 
Solana's stated goal of alleviating the humanitarian plight of the Kosovars. In addition, Freedman 
notes that NATO's own expectations of a speedy bombing campaign and its relation of this to the 
media, created unrealistic public expectations in regard to the humanitarian costs of the operation 
itself.77 As a result, as Operation Allied Force degenerated into a drawn out bombing campaign 
many international observers began accusing NATO actions, rather than those of the Serbians, of 
causing the Kosovar refugee flow.78 
 A disconnect developed between public expectations and the reality of the conduct of 
Operation Allied Force. As Bill Frelick, the Senior Policy Analyst for the United States 
Committee for Refugees remarked at a Senate Hearing in April, “We are left with a strange, 
ironic, and tragic discord between the military and humanitarian realities. NATO embarked on 
the bombing campaign purportedly to stop the slow ethnic cleansing of Kosovo…Tragically, but 
predictably, it had the opposite effect.”79 The magnitude of the disconnect, and the risk of the 
CNN effect backlashing against NATO itself, significantly influenced NATO's response to the 
Kosovar refugee crisis. Facing growing public pressure, NATO's early humanitarian-based 
rhetoric contributed to the organization's later need to find alternative humanitarian responses 
and successes in the form of refugee relief efforts. In this way, the humanitarian version of the 	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CNN Effect contributed not only to initial Western motivations to pay attention to the Kosovo 
crisis, but also to the manner in which NATO responded to unfolding events, conducted its 
bombing campaign, and carried out ad hoc refugee assistance. 
 By the time the first bombs of Operation Allied Force fell on 24 March 1999, Albania 
and Macedonia had been accepting Kosovar refugees for the better part of six months. With 
increased fighting within Kosovo in early 1999 and the launch of NATO’s bombing campaign, 
more refugees were expected to cross out of Kosovo. The UNHCR, for example, had begun 
negotiating with the government of Albania in 1998 “to allocate land for refugees in case the 
conflict in Yugoslavia worsened.”80 No one, however, was prepared for the actual magnitude of 
the refugee crisis that started in March. The OSCE estimated there would be 50,000 Kosovar 
refugees, while the UNHCR planned for between 40,000 and 80,000. Even the most alarmist 
estimates stopped at 100,000.81 In late March, over 64,000 Kosovar refugees crossed into 
Albania at the border crossing alone. At the time, the UNHCR had one staffer in Kukës, who, 
unsurprisingly, was completely overwhelmed.82 By the time NATO’s bombing ended and 
Milošević had agreed to NATO’s terms, a period of 78 days, over one million Kosovars had been 
forced from their homes. More than 800,000 Kosovars had fled Kosovo into Albania, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro. Another 550,000 Kosovars became internally displaced persons 
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within Kosovo.83 An estimated 444,000 refugees found shelter in Albania, 344,500 in 
Macedonia, and 69,900 in Montenegro.84  
 The UNHCR quickly tried to respond, organizing an emergency response team to assist 
in Albania on March 29. It took until April 2, however, for the UNHCR reinforcements to reach 
Kukës. The main challenge facing the UNHCR emergency response team at the end of March, 
which continued to challenge the UNHCR and other civilian agencies throughout the crisis, was 
funding and logistics. The refugee and military crises stretched the logistical capacities of 
Albania and Macedonia to the breaking point and military needs inevitably took precedence. 
Thus the UNHCR-chartered aircraft flying into Tirana with the emergency response team was 
delayed an extra day to make room for NATO aircraft.85 While military primacy complicated 
civilian response efforts, the sheer magnitude of the crisis left the UNHCR and other agencies 
unequipped to take the lead position in organizing international response regardless. Andrew 
Jones of the UNHCR reported, “Due to the volume of refugees and the speed of entry into 
Albania the response required was way above the 80,000 contingency for which the UNHCR had 
planned.”86 Suddenly, civilian humanitarian agencies had an extra 720,000 refugees to support. 
In the initial chaos, a “capabilities vacuum” formed that left relief efforts piecemeal and 
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uncoordinated. Almost by default, NATO took the lead in refugee relief efforts.87 As Walter 
Clarke notes, “No international agency can compete…with the resources available to an 
individual sovereign state determined to exercise national policy imperatives,” or in this case an 
organization such as NATO.88 
 
Military Humanitarianism Emerges 
 
 As Kosovar refugees flooded across the borders into Macedonia, Albania, and 
Montenegro, NATO attempted to pick up the pieces of refugee assistance. NATO, however, had 
few plans in place for such a contingency, though some member-states, such as the United 
States, had limited contingency plans.89 Senator Ted Stevens visited Albania and Macedonia 
shortly after the start of Operation Allied Force and recalled,  
the refugee situation appeared to be very grave and seriously lacking in 
organization and planning. It appears we and NATO had simply made no 
provision for the flow of refugees…My memory will last forever seeing people 
standing in line for a three-quarter-of-a-mile line to receive one meal a day, cold 
meal a day, with eight people serving 38,000 people in that line we saw.90 
Despite this rocky start, NATO quickly turned its vast funding and logistical capacity to the 
problem of relieving Kosovar refugees. By April 6, Mercy Corps Vice President Nancy Lindborg 	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was praising NATO’s rapid “logistical support for U.N. and international relief groups to bring 
food, water, and shelter to the refugees camped along the border.”91 
 Although NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies temporarily united over their 
common concern for Kosovar refugees, competition remained. For civilian humanitarian 
organizations, not only was the well-being of the Kosovar refugees at risk, but also the 
organizations’ institutional values and purposes for existing. For many of the major civilian 
humanitarian organizations, neutrality is central to both the manner in which they function and 
also in their own self conceptions. The very mission of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), for example, is to serve as an “impartial, neutral and independent organization 
whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed 
conflict.”92 NATO was anything but neutral and was, in fact, actively fighting on behalf of the 
Kosovars against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It remains unclear what impact NATO’s 
lack of neutrality had on their relief efforts. What is clear is that both NATO’s partiality and 
militarization deeply concerned many civilian humanitarian agencies. For example, on April 14, 
UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata met with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana 
over her concerns about maintaining the “civilian nature of the operation” with NATO’s 
increasing involvement. She went on to warn that it was essential to “maintain the civilian nature 
of the camps” and confine NATO’s role to “refugee protection” and logistical support.93 While 
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an element of Ogata’s concerns, as well as those of the broader civilian humanitarian 
community, reflected concerns over NATO encroachment on their traditional responsibilities and 
turf, it is also indicative of broader organizational cultural differences in outlook and procedures 
that hindered cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies. 
 Ironically, NATO was equally anxious to reassure themselves and civilian humanitarian 
organizations that they wanted no humanitarian role. On April 21, as NATO’s deployment in 
Albania, Albania Force or AFOR, was in the midst of transporting thousands of Kosovar 
refugees away from Kukës to AFOR-built refugee camps, AFOR spokesman Commander 
Maltinti avowed that “NATO is not seeking to create a humanitarian role for itself…we are only 
concentrating on providing military resources not immediately available to civil agencies.”94 
This balancing act between conducting humanitarian assistance but disavowing serious 
involvement looks odd when compared to high-level NATO statements, such as a statement to 
the press on April 12 that “These extreme and criminally irresponsible policies, which cannot be 
defended on any grounds, have made necessary and justify the military action by NATO.”95 It 
makes much more sense, however, when compared to attitudes towards humanitarian operations 
and peacekeeping within the various NATO militaries. The United States is perhaps an extreme 
case, but clearly demonstrates the conflicted attitude many militaries had regarding non-
warfighting missions. The United States Army’s manual on peace operations at the time of the 
Kosovar refugee crisis argued that the Army was “extremely well suited” to these operations, but 
also that soldiers’ warfighting capabilities are “unavoidably affected by the nature of the peace 
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operation.”96 The US military and NATO recognized that only they were capable of filling the 
logistical gap in refugee assistance, but they also feared such operations as degrading their 
primary function of warfighting.  
 
Funding 
 
 While most civilian humanitarian agencies, such as Mercy Corps, recognized the 
necessity of NATO military support and welcomed logistical support, they did not do so without 
reservation. Funding and logistical support became the key foci of competition and cooperation 
between NATO’s military elements and civilian humanitarian agencies. Admittedly, an 
examination of humanitarian funding during the crisis highlights competition between NATO 
and civilian humanitarian organizations. This element of competition is important, however, 
because attempts at cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations were 
shaped by continuous competition over funding. These funds were converted into personnel, 
resources, and the influence to make decisions and lead negotiations with the Albanian 
government and local authorities. 
 During the Kosovar refugee crisis, the UNHCR struggled to fund its budget. Although 
the UNHCR receives a small part of the UN’s standard operating budget, it mostly relies on 
donations, as do other civilian humanitarian organizations.97 Additionally, many of the largest 
donors, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, are NATO member-states. In 
Kosovo, however, these key donors often chose not to donate to civilian agencies, or at least not 
in as significant quantities as previous refugee crises. The UNHCR observed during the crisis 
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that many donors chose to “assist refugees directly through” national assistance organizations, 
such as USAID, “or through respective NATO forces.”98 States had many reasons for funneling 
resources through NATO and country-based aid organizations, but the role of the media is 
inescapable. The UNHCR observed that constant television coverage of the Kosovar crisis 
“brought the crisis more to the consciousness of the citizens of major donor countries.” This 
increased consciousness of publics, in turn, contributed to states’ need “to be seen to be doing 
something” directly rather than through intermediaries such as the UNHCR.99 In May, UNHCR 
High Commissioner Sadako Ogata issued one of many appeals for additional funding. Ogata 
begged, "We are looking to our traditional donors to provide us with the financial means to cope 
with this emergency. I appeal in particular to countries in Europe and the European 
Commission.”100 In addition, many donors were somewhat reluctant to donate to the UNHCR 
due to its initial absence from relief efforts.101 
 Beyond NATO’s immediately apparent contribution to Kosovar refugee assistance in the 
construction of camps and shouldering the majority of the logistical carrying capacity, matters 
quickly grew far murkier. As with most NATO missions, each member state independently bore 
all costs resulting from operations in and around Kosovo in 1999, rather than costs being drawn 
from one of NATO’s central budgets. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, 
"There is no single source of consistent data on how much each NATO member state contributed 	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to the military and non-military activities related to Kosovo.”102 What is left is an incomplete, 
and at times inconsistent picture of the financial and material resources mobilized by NATO’s 
member states. In total, the UNHCR received roughly $347 million earmarked for humanitarian 
assistance efforts in the former Yugoslavia during 1999.103 Of that, $173.5 million came from 
NATO member-states, $0.9 million from the Council of Europe, $75.5 million from the 
European Commission, and $12 million from private donors.104 Of the funds earmarked for 
humanitarian relief in the former Yugoslavia, approximately $59 million went to Kosovar 
refugee relief efforts in Albania.105 
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NATO Members Military Humanitarian 
Spending106 
UNHCR Donations107 
Belgium Not Available $1 million 
Canada Not Available $10.1 million 
Czech Republic $14.1 million $8.7 million 
Denmark $4 million $8.9 million 
France Not Available $20.9 million 
Germany $32.3 million $5.8 million 
Greece $10 million $0.0 million 
Hungary $2.6 $0.0 million 
Iceland Not Available $.07 million 
Italy $91 million $2.2 million 
Luxembourg Not Available $1.5 million 
The Netherlands Not Available $1.5 million 
Norway Not Available $20.6 million 
Poland $3 million $0.0 million 
Portugal $0.07 million $0.0 million 
Spain $9.2 million $1.3 million 
Turkey $6.6 million $0.0 million 
United Kingdom Not Available $7.1 million 
United States $124.6 million $103.5 million 
Total $287.5 million $173.5 million 
Figure 1: Humanitarian Spending of NATO Member-States 
 The above table, while incomplete, shows a striking difference in funding commitments 
between NATO’s military contingents and UNHCR commitments. Even with the costs of the 
military humanitarian efforts of eight NATO member-states missing, NATO spent over $100 
million more on military-provided relief than they donated to the UNHCR in the entirety of the 
former Yugoslavia. In addition, these figures do not reflect the additional money NATO 
member-states donated to other civilian humanitarian agencies. For example, in May 1999 alone, 
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the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migrations awarded civilian 
humanitarian agencies, such as Mercy Corps, the American Refugee Committee, and the 
International Federation of the Red Cross, $16.5 million for efforts relating to the Kosovar 
refugee crisis.108 
 While the U.S. was one of the main heavy lifters, NATO utilized the concept of role 
specialization to most efficiently utilize the financial and in-kind contributions of NATO 
member-states.109 For example, the Czech Republic sent a small contingent of engineers and 
medical personnel to Albania that was used to construct a field hospital and refugee camp at a 
cost of $8.5 million.110 Similarly the Hungarian NATO contingent was organized into two 
Sanitation/Spraying Teams that targeted sanitation issues in refugee camps and collective 
centers.111 This is one example of a workaround used to share logistical supplies. The camps the 
Hungarian Teams traveled to were built and managed by other NATO member-states. By 
focusing on a specialized task, in this case sanitation, the Hungarians were, in effect, sharing 
their supplies with other countries but circumventing problematic property rights issues. 
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 In most refugee crises the UNHCR had generally been one of the largest and best-funded 
humanitarian agencies on the scene. The UNHCR then translated this money into power and 
influence, allowing it to direct responses to refugee crises.112 As a result of the funding situation 
in Kosovo, however, the UNHCR found itself a second-class player in comparison to the 
funding, resources, and power of NATO. One UNHCR report bemoaned the fact that because of 
the UNHCR’s “relatively small” share of the funding pie, the UNHCR was prevented “from 
playing its classic role of leading agency in the management of the operation and caused a 
vacuum in terms of overall coordination of the emergency operation.”113 Another report spent 
several pages attempting to explain “why UNHCR had direct responsibility for a smaller 
proportion of the refugee camps than might be expected.”114 A third report attempted to reframe 
the situation by arguing the “enormous resources deployed” through such a wide “variety of 
relief agencies and their different technical backgrounds” made a coordinating role by the 
UNHCR even more “crucial.”115  
 The UNHCR’s existential crisis was not built upon straws; the organization experienced 
very real shortfalls in both funding and influence. As analyst Jim Whitman later noted, “Critics 
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and donors combined to drive a downward spiral of funding shortages.”116 From early May 
onwards, the UNHCR was operating on fumes. In April, the UNHCR issued an appeal for $143 
million to cover emergency aid for the next three months. By May 7 it had only received $77.4 
million and exhausted the last $11.8 million on May 6. To complete operations in May, the 
UNHCR estimated it needed an additional $40 million.117 Four days later, the UNHCR warned 
that “If significant resources are not announced immediately, UNHCR will not be able to make 
further essential commitments to assist the refugees.”118 By the end of the month, the worst of 
the funding shortage had been met and only $10 million of the appeal remained unmet.119 The 
underfunding of the UNHCR is not, in itself, unique. In fact, it is common for the UNHCR to be 
underfunding and continually appealing for donations. The impact of the funding shortage in 
Kosovo, however, was unique in that the UNHCR was underfunded by traditional Western 
European donors and that NATO was unwilling to wait for the UNHCR to slowly collect 
resources and implement refugee assistance efforts. Instead, NATO began establishing refugee 
camp and leading assistance efforts during the lag period, which in most refugee crises would be 
normal. 
 Most of these funding battles took place outside of the Balkans, in places such as Geneva, 
New York, and Brussels. In Albania, competition for funding, and the resulting resources, took 
place either informally or through the Emergency Management Group (EMG). The Emergency 	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Management Group (EMG) was established to ease the logistic and resource distribution among 
the roughly 200 civilian humanitarian organizations and NATO forces operating in Albania.	  120 
The major partners in the EMG were the Government of Albania, Albania Force (AFOR), the 
UNHCR, the World Food Program, the World Health Organization, and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as well as other major non-governmental organizations.121 
The EMG aimed to bring together the most important actors providing Kosovar refugee 
assistance and coordinate relief efforts, resource distribution, and liaise with the Albanian 
Government.	  122 Within the EMG, tasks were divided among five “desks”: Information, Security, 
Food, Logistic, and Shelter.	  123 AFOR attempted to use the EMG as a means of building trust and 
cooperation between itself and civilian aid organizations. AFOR personnel were attached to each 
of the EMG’s main desks and an AFOR help desk was created to facilitate cooperation with 
civilian agencies. In an attempt to decrease competition among civilian agencies, all civilian 
requests for logistic support from NATO had to come through the EMG so that NATO spread its 
resources evenly.	  124 While the EMG succeeded in bringing together all the major actors, its 
success in facilitating cooperation and coordination is debatable. 
 In practice, the EMG served as yet another forum for competition among civilian 
humanitarian organizations and between them and NATO. Even accounts of who established the 	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EMG reveal the degree that competition permeated relations between NATO and the UNHCR. 
Based on NATO accounts, the EMG appears as the child of the Albanian Government and 
NATO’s AFOR. 125 UNHCR reports, on the other hand, describe the EMG as being established 
by the Government of Albania and the UNHCR. 126 Clearly NATO’s and the UNHCR’s accounts 
cannot both be accurate and the origin of the EMG may have been a mix of both accounts. For 
the UNHCR, the EMG “filled out, to some extent, the vacuum in coordination and in the 
management of the crisis” which would normally have been filled by the UNHCR directly.127 
UNHCR Senior Site Planning Coordinator Hossein Sarem-Kalali, also the Head of the EMG 
Shelter Desk, argues that the EMG provided the UNHCR with a platform through which it could 
shape policies and strategies of other agencies.128 While Sarem-Kalali uses the dissemination of 
the UNHCR Guidelines and Plans of Action for Shelter as an example, fellow UNHCR worker 
Andrew Jones notes that these guidelines were “given little attention, but also the sites [of 
refugee camps] were constructed without proper consultation” with UNHCR experts. 129 
Meanwhile, NATO accounts of the EMG depict AFOR as shepherding the many disparate 
civilian humanitarian organizations into some semblance of order.130  
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 In sum, ongoing competition between NATO, the UNHCR, and other civilian 
humanitarian agencies impeded efforts at cooperation, even within the EMG. Funding shortfalls 
for the UNHCR are not, in themselves, unusual. Usually, however, the UNHCR is not competing 
for influence and leadership in directing the international response to refugee crises. During the 
Kosovar refugee crisis, however, NATO was unwilling to wait while the UNHCR slowly 
gathered the resources to respond. Instead, NATO poured resources into Albania and Macedonia 
and, in doing so, took the lead role in providing refugee assistance. 
 
Logistics 
 Alongside competition over funding, civilian humanitarian organizations competed with 
each other and with NATO for the resources NATO’s logistic network brought into the Balkans. 
From another perspective, however, logistics proved one of the most successful arenas of 
cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies. NATO capabilities ferried 
resources into and around Albania, worked with the UNHCR in transporting refugees, and 
helped civilian aid workers travel across difficult terrain. 
 Logistically, NATO was ideally situated to respond to the Kosovar refugee crisis. During 
the Cold War, NATO established a logistical support system designed to support a major war in 
the case of Soviet aggression in Europe. In the post-Cold War period the basic structures of this 
system were maintained, with strong military staging bases in Germany and Italy. This logistical 
system was converted to support both military and humanitarian operations in and around 
Kosovo. NATO’s operations surrounding the Kosovo crisis in 1999 were some of its earliest 
truly multinational operations. Although it may seem counterintuitive for a multinational military 
alliance, until the early 1990s NATO was, at best, ambivalent towards multinational military 
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cooperation.131 During the Cold War, military integration was largely limited to the national 
corps level within the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group.132 After the end of the 
Cold War, NATO’s member-states contributed smaller military units, necessitating the creation 
of multinational force structures. Although NATO began this process in 1991, implementing the 
new command structures was still underway in 1999, putting Kosovo in the midst of this 
transitional period.133 
 NATO’s new multinationalism was accompanied by logistical growing pains. Until 1996, 
NATO’s logistical framework was based on national responsibility. Each member-state was 
responsible for supporting its own forces or obtaining support through Host Nation Support 
Agreements. In 1996 NATO granted commanders of multinational forces the authority to 
“coordinate” logistics and recognized that “logistics are not solely a national responsibility.”134 
Efforts to implement the new 1996 logistics framework, however, were stalled by 1999. In 
particular, national laws regarding property titles and usage restrictions and financial burden-
sharing issues have, according to analyst Thomas-Durell Young, “confounded efforts to effect 
multinational logistics cooperative arrangements.”135 Thus in Albania, NATO created a 
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temporary logistical arrangement in which member-states largely supported their own units and 
Kosovar refugee assistance efforts, but collaborated in regards to logistics delivery. 
 As the UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogato told NATO Secretary General Javier 
Solana, “I have asked for NATO member states to provide support because we need it, their 
airlift capacity, their airport and seaport logistic capacity, some of the site constructions.”136 To 
support the UNHCR and establish broader refugee relief efforts, NATO deployed AFOR and the 
Ace Mobile Force. To ameliorate the limitations of Albania’s infrastructure, NATO took control 
of Tirana’s Rinas International Airport and much of the Durres port. By mid-April, Tirana could 
accommodate almost 300 flights daily, in sharp contrast to the 13 it could accommodate at the 
start of March.137 AFOR equipped the airport with new traffic control radar systems. By the end 
of the crisis, 3,489 flights had landed, including 1,139 flights moving humanitarian supplies 
totaling over 10,000 metric tons. In addition, over 4,578 metric tons of aid entered Albania 
through Tirana by helicopter.138 As the only major airport in Albania, however, landing space at 
Tirana was fiercely fought over, even among military elements split between warfighting and 
humanitarian relief.139  
 While revitalizing Tirana Airport was essential, most heavy military equipment and 
humanitarian aid entered Albania through the port at Durres. AFOR established a Port 
Management and Coordination Center, which worked with local Albanian port authorities to 	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coordinate port functions and the inflow of humanitarian aid. Thanks to cooperation between 
NATO forces and the Albanian government, unloading was increased to twelve ships daily. 
AFOR also established a storage and marshaling area in which unloaded supplies could be safely 
stored before being transported to different locations within Albania.140 Before supplies could be 
relocated, Albania’s weak transportation network had to be addressed. AFOR engineers and 
NATO contractors repaired over 189 kilometers of road during the operation to facilitate over-
ground transportation. In addition, AFOR had over 1,719 vehicles with a total daily capacity of 
almost 1,000 tons of aid. As civilian humanitarian agencies assumed greater responsibilities, 
these resources were rarely used as most civilian aid organizations used local Albanian drivers 
and vehicles as a planned measure to stimulate Albania’s economy.141 
 Building upon Cold War era logistic structures, NATO created workarounds to adapt to 
the multinational military context in Albania. At the most basic level, the success of these 
workarounds is evident in the fact that none of the NATO military units or the Kosovar refugee 
camps they established experienced any significant supply shortages. Unlike the UNHCR, the 
Kosovar refugee camps built and managed by NATO forces never came close to closing due to 
lack of funding or resources. From an Alliance perspective, specialization allowed NATO to 
better integrate its resources into a more coherent assistance effort without challenging national 
logistics prerogatives. 
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Militarized Refugee Camps 
 Examining funding and logistics in isolation from the broader context of the Kosovar 
refugee crisis and without a close examination of refugee assistance on the ground creates a 
picture primarily of competition. Important levels of cooperation did occur, however. Just as the 
previous two sections on funding and logistics examined elements of competition between 
NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations, the next two sections on refugee camps and the 
transition from military to civilian leadership explore aspects of cooperation. Before shifting 
focus to the numerous refugee camps established in Albania, however, it is important to establish 
what these camps did, and did not, do.  
 If the well-being of the Kosovar refugees had depended solely on NATO and civilian 
humanitarian agencies, then the refugee crisis of 1999 would have developed into a full blown 
catastrophe. There was a roughly one-week delay between the uptick of Kosovar refugees 
flowing into Albania and a significant international response. Given the unexpected magnitude 
of the crisis, this one-week delay actually represents a relatively quick response. Nevertheless, 
even that week-long delay could have been devastating for the majority of Kosovar refugees. In 
the first ten days following the initiation of Operation Allied Force, some 155,000 Kosovar 
refugees crossed into Albania.142 In blunt terms, a UNHCR report stated, “The border areas did 
not have the capacity of receiving such a huge number of people” and neither did civilian or 
military organizations in those first ten days.143 In fact, the only reason the crisis was not worse 
was the unprecedented response of local Albanians, particularly in the border areas, in opening 
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their homes to Kosovar refugees. The UNHCR reported, “successful absorption of a large 
number of refugees into Albania was largely due to the hospitality of the Albanian people in 
accepting refugees into their homes.”144 
 
Alternatives to the Refugee Camps 
 It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of these private accommodations, 
particularly in the ability of Albania and the international community to respond to the mass 
outflow of refugees around the start of Operation Allied Force. Roughly 305,592 Kosovar 
refugees, or 61 percent of the total documented number of refugees in Albania, are estimated to 
have stayed in private accommodations.145 Seventy percent of refugees housed in private 
accommodation stayed with urban families, while 30 percent stayed with rural families. Roughly 
10,766 rural families hosted refugees and the average rural family size increased by 85 
percent.146 According to monthly registration efforts by the government of Albania, each host 
family accommodated an average of nine Kosovar refugees.147 In contrast, only 68,909 
documented Kosovar refugees in Albania stayed in refugee camps.148 Thus while contemporary 
media coverage, as well as later scholarship, focused on the efforts of NATO and humanitarian 
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agencies to build temporary shelters and refugee camps, the full potential of the Kosovar refugee 
crisis was averted by ordinary Albanian families. 
 Conditions in private accommodations varied widely and the international community 
initially faced challenges in assisting these refugees. The international community’s attitude is 
best captured by the UNHCR’s statement that private accommodation “was the best option for 
shelter due to the fact that no major capital investment is required.”149 Depending on the case, 
Kosovar refugees might be wholly supported by host families, make partial financial 
contributions to host families, or be forced to fully meet their living costs. For many Kosovar 
refugees, meeting any sort of financial obligation was difficult since most had been forced to pay 
multiple bribes just to leave Kosovo. Eventually, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies 
organized relief to families hosting refugees in the form of cash grants or in-kind support. While 
this system was ideal in theory, in practice many refugees in private accommodation saw little to 
none of this aid.150 In August, British volunteer Joannes Ayers met with some of the leaders of 
the “Association of Kosova Refugees in Durres.” Ayers recounts the President going “to great 
lengths to explain how useless they [the UNHCR] had been…how since their evacuation several 
months earlier they had only received one aid packet.”151 
 In addition to private accommodation and refugee camps, roughly 21 percent of Kosovar 
refugees in Albania stayed in collective centers.152 Over 300 buildings housed 91,323 
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refugees.153 These collective centers ranged widely in size, quality, and management, making 
finding specifics for any one center very difficult. Various humanitarian organizations and local 
municipal authorities managed most centers. Public buildings, such as schools, accounted for 90 
percent of the buildings used,154 but private facilities and large abandoned buildings were also 
renovated to house refugees.155 In Kukës alone, 70 collective centers were established. UNHCR 
worker Stefan Meersschert observed, “most often refugees had to pay a substantial rent, certainly 
in regard to the often poor conditions of those buildings.”156 Despite the often-poor living 
conditions and expensive rent, the UNHCR reported that these collective centers represented “a 
more cost effective solution in terms of capital investment for construction and management” 
than refugee camps.157 Collective centers were often ad hoc responses by local government or 
individual civilian humanitarian agencies, both of which left few records. 
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Figure 2: Refugee Accommodation in Albania 
Source: Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, 3. 
 
 Despite the relative unimportance of refugee camps in Albania, huge sums of money 
were poured into the camps and they captured the bulk of media attention. For instance, the U.S. 
Department of Defense reportedly spent between $45 and $70 million on just one refugee 
camp.159 Over 50 refugee camps were eventually built, although roughly 10 percent were never 
used due to the rapid repatriation of the Kosovar refugees.160 Nevertheless, even at the peak of 
the Kosovar refugee crisis these camps only housed roughly 68,909 Kosovar refugees.161 The 
initial wave of camp building coincided with the period in which the UNHCR remained largely 
out of the picture and the Emergency Management Group was just being established. As a result, 
NATO and humanitarian agencies operated largely independent of each other in building refugee 	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camps.162 Only after the worst of the crisis passed did the UNHCR and other key civilian 
humanitarian agencies assume a directing role. Thus, although the refugee camps were the least 
important measure in helping Albania cope with 465,800 refugees, the camps were the focus of 
international involvement, media attention, and where competition and cooperation between the 
new NATO military humanitarians and civilian humanitarian organizations was most intense. 
 
Refugee Camps and Barracks 
 Initial NATO and civilian attention focused on the area around Kukës and the nearby 
Morini border crossing. The magnitude of the crisis facing Kukës was immense. On March 30 
alone, over 16,000 Kosovar refugees crossed into Albania near Kukës and by the following day 
the total reached 90,000.163 The same day NATO established regular helicopter relief flights 
between Tirana and Kukës ferrying humanitarian supplies.164 A few days later, Italy had a 
convoy on the road to Kukës, the result of Operation Rainbow, an effort led by the Italian 
government involving military, government, and private aid which shipped supplies to shelter 
25,000 Kosovar refugees as well as a mobile hospital, trucks, and buses. By April 8 the Italian 
military opened a refugee camp between the Morini crossing and Kukës, which initially housed 
3,000 Kosovar refugees. The camp also included a medical center and psychological support for 
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refugees and the capacity to medevac critical cases to Tirana.165 The Italians quickly constructed 
camp eventually grew into the Kukës Transit Center and over 423,000 Kosovar refugees were 
processed through it during the crisis.166 By April 19, the newly minted Albania Force (AFOR) 
was fully established with 2,000 troops on the ground and plans to send an additional 6,000. 167 
Civilian humanitarian agencies, such as the UNHCR, were conspicuously absent from these 
early NATO mobilization efforts. On April 21, almost a month after the start of Operation Allied 
Force, NATO spokesman Commander Malinti, was still referring to making “preliminary contact 
with…the UNHCR, the international and non-governmental organisations” in regard to building 
refugee camps.168 
 For a multitude of reasons, it quickly became apparent that continuing to support Kosovar 
refugees in the Kukës area was untenable. Kukës, and northern Albania in general, had little to 
recommend itself as capable of accommodating the burgeoning numbers of Kosovar refugees. 
One UNHCR report noted, “While Albania is considered the poorest country in Europe, Kukës 
[the main crossing point into Albania] is considered the poorest city in Albania.”169 The 1990s 
were a difficult decade for Albania. At the start of the decade, Albania’s economy collapsed with 
the end of communism and isolationism. Albania’s still recovering economy was again crippled 
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in 1997 when a pyramid financial scheme fell apart. In part as a result, government and judicial 
institutions lost most of their remaining legitimacy and instability increased as official and 
traditional local centers of authority came into open conflict. Albania lacked basic infrastructure 
and much of the infrastructure it did have was poorly maintained. The Tirana-based government 
was weakest in Northern Albania and as a result infrastructure there was in especially poor 
shape. 170 For example, due to the extreme isolation of Kukës from Tirana, the UNHCR reported 
that the “Kukës population supported most of the [refugee] burden on its own.”171 Albania’s 
poverty, therefore, shaped every aspect of the Kosovar refugee crisis, from its initial phases to 
the closing of refugee camps. 
 As NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies began establishing refugee camps, they 
increasingly looked away from Kukës and northern Albania for camp locations. Although 
building camps further away from Kosovo posed its own difficulties, both NATO and the main 
civilian agencies agreed it was the best course of action. Three main factors shaped their 
decisions: the lack of capacity in northern Albania to support refugees, the need for security, and 
the fear of successive waves of refugees. Given northern Albania’s pre-existing poverty, the 
sudden appearance of hundreds of thousands of refugees had already stretched resources and 
infrastructure to the breaking point. Hossein Sarem-Kalali, the UNHCR Senior Shelter Site 
Planning Coordinator, warned, “The remoteness of these regions and poor access made the 
provision of assistance and aid extremely difficult. Besides, the security of refugees could not be 
guaranteed in these border areas.”172 The area around Kukës, and much of northern Albania in 	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general, experienced spillover violence from the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The KLA used 
northern Albania and refugee camps near the border as recruiting grounds and staging centers. 
Mortar rounds commonly landed in Albania. Aid workers often had to temporarily move 
positions further away from the border, a UNHCR post had a near miss with two mortar shells, 
and in one of the most striking cases over 8,000 Albanian villagers near Kukës fled their homes 
after a bout of particularly active shelling.173 In addition, there was constant concern that another 
wave of Kosovar refugees could, at any moment, appear at the border crossings and have 
nowhere to go.174 As a result, a key priority in the selection of camp locations was to shift the 
burden of supporting Kosovar refugees to other regions of Albania. Sarem-Kalali goes on to 
explain, “The transfer of the refugees to other parts of Albania was the only option left to the 
international aid agencies.”175 
 Recognizing that the border areas were saturated only answered part of the dilemma of 
building camps. In a short period of time, NATO had to find either public or private land on 
which camps could be built. Establishing camps and finding land required negotiations with local 
and national Albanian government officials, as well as with private individuals. Negotiations 
covered not only finding usable land, but also compensation agreements, environmental 
responsibilities, and eventual cleanup expectations when the camps closed.176 The ad hoc nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 UNHCR, Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, May 31, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80b38.html). 
 
174 UNHCR, “Kosovo Crisis Update,” UNHCR, April 22, 1999 (http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b80e1f.html). 
 
175 Sarem-Kalali, Albania: Provision of Refugee Shelter in Kosovo Emergency Operation, 1. 
 
176 Jones, Albania: Direct and Indirect Environmental Impacts of Refugees, v. 
 
 	   52 
of initial camp construction, however, “led to a highly complex pattern of camps, collective 
centres and hard shelters.”177  
 Nevertheless, by the end of the crisis, over 1,2000 acres were devoted to refugee camps. 
Of this land, 214 acres were in private hands, 934 acres were productive state land, and another 
84 acres were unproductive state land.178 While the Government of Albania was under great 
pressure to provide NATO with land for refugee camps, this land was often unsuitable for 
camps. 179 The Spitalle Camp, for example, established near Durres and housing 2,200 refugees,  
was located next to a garbage dump and a tannery, as well as in an area that had just recently 
been in the tidal flats.181 Even the UNHCR was prone to building camps in undesirable locations 
out of necessity. The UNHCR Hamallaj Camps 1 and 2 were both built in swamps.182 
 In the confusion of the crisis, several camps were established without proper 
consultations, resulting in long-term difficulties. Additionally, lack of a strong humanitarian 
agency presence resulted in avoidable mistakes as NATO and other less-experienced groups 
attempted to fill the gap. In many cases, initial lack of cooperation in camp construction resulted 
in long lasting bitterness between NATO and civilian aid organizations.  
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 One of the most egregious failures of both negotiation and cooperation between NATO 
and civilian humanitarian organizations was the establishment of Camp Hope by the US 
Department of Defense. Camp Hope was a centerpiece in Operation Sustain Hope and was built 
hastily to house 20,000 Kosovar refugees.183 Unfortunately, the Department of the Defense 
ignored two warnings from the UNHCR Environmental Team against the location agreed upon 
with the Fier municipality, which happened to be in the middle of a swamp. The camp was 
prohibitively expensive, costing as much as $70 million.184 To put that in perspective, the 
International Federation of the Red Cross established a program to house Kosovar refugees that 
cost roughly $112 per refugee. In contrast, Camp Hope cost approximately $2,5000 per 
refugee.185 After all the expense, the refugees were forced to evacuate due to flooding.186 The 
desire for a quick fix and media praise, led the US to ignore attempts at collaboration with the 
UNHCR and created long-term difficulties in operating in the Fiers area and in post-crisis 
cleanup efforts.  
 Once locations were found, NATO forces began building the camp structures. Although 
civilian humanitarian agencies were involved in this initial process, for the most part it was 
NATO military forces designing and constructing the camps.188 Critically, there was no NATO-	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wide procedure for camp construction. As a result, national norms of NATO’s member states 
dictated the structure and eventual living standards of the camps. Afterwards the UNHCR 
sharply criticized these ad hoc campsites as being based on each organizations’ “own norms and 
standards” rather than accepted humanitarian standards.189 In the cases of military-constructed 
camps in particular, the UNHCR accused them of being “built to ‘working,’ and not for ‘living’ 
standards, which negatively impacted the living conditions of Kosovar refugees.190 
 Many images of the refugee camps show neatly organized camps with bright white tents 
laid out in crisp rows and columns. While making for a great publicity tool, these grid-like camps 
bucked twenty years of humanitarian guidelines. The UNHCR readily admits that grid layouts 
are often the simplest mode for organizing refugee camps and maximizing space, but considers 
this format the least desirable. At the most basic level, high population densities themselves are 
undesirable because they lead to increased problems with sanitation and disease control. At a 
more human level, the grid layout adds to the difficulties refugees face in adapting to their new 
environment. The UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies warns, “a rigid grid design makes the 
creation of community identity difficult, as the refugees are not usually accustomed to living in 
such a pattern.”191 Instead, shelter construction should be family oriented and camps organized 
“into small community units or villages…[which] in turn organized central core services.” 192 In 
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addition, those bright white tents were considered a means of last resort by the humanitarian 
community and were under no circumstances considered acceptable long-term shelter. 193 
 While many of NATO’s member states had previously conducted peacekeeping missions 
and had experience with humanitarian disasters, none were truly prepared for the Kosovar 
refugee crisis. The U.S.’s existing doctrine on Peace Operations was representative in its 
assumption that any humanitarian assistance performed by the military would be auxiliary to that 
of civilian humanitarian organizations. The last doctrine published before Kosovo on 
peacekeeping cautions commanders, “in most situations, logistics, communications, and security 
are those capabilities most needed by the NGO…it is, however, crucial to remember in such 
missions the role of the JTF should be to enable – not perform – NGO tasks.”194 Similarly, a 
draft NATO doctrine for peacekeeping published in 1998 argued that NATO forces were best 
suited for “peace enforcement action against those responsible for threats to peace and security, 
or who carry out acts of aggression.”195 Like the American doctrine, NATO forces were 
envisioned as enabling humanitarian efforts by organizations such as the UNHCR. None of the 
countries who participated in Kosovar refugee relief efforts were prepared to undertake a 
humanitarian assistance operation without the guidance of civilian organizations. 
 Without uniform guidelines on the care of refugees and in most cases without doctrinal 
guidance from their own governments, NATO’s military components fell back on what they new 
how to build: barracks. In a telling slip, the U.S. Department of Defense announced plans to 	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build “barracks” in Albania to house the Kosovar refugees.196 Designed primarily for large 
numbers of single men, many of the resulting barrack-styled camps were poorly suited for large 
refugee families.197 The quality of camp structures varied widely across the camps built by 
different NATO member states. In some camps, Kosovar refugees lived in shelters with more 
luxuries than many would have had in their own homes. The camp built by the Kuwaiti 
government, for example, was air-conditioned, a rare commodity in the poverty-stricken 
Balkans. In contrast, a camp built by the Turkish military was described as housing refugees in 
“rudimentary shelters.”198 More in this vein, British volunteer Joannes Ayers visited over-
crowded camps in which over 30 people were crammed into “family rooms no bigger than 10 ft. 
x 15 ft.”199  
 In contrast to NATO’s barrack-style refugee camps, the Quatrom refugee camp managed 
by Relief International was constructed in a very different manner and much more in line with 
the UNHCR’s ideal type of refugee camp. The camp was built by a German military unit, Oxfam 
donated the water and sanitation system, while the German Red Cross installed it. Although 
Quatrom was built by the German military, it was laid out according to principles established by 
Relief International.  Rather than being a grid, tents were organized into clusters with 20 to 24 
tents per cluster. This arrangement was designed to foster a sense of community and agency. 
Camp manager Bobbie Lord explained on May 15 that, 	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Each cluster elects two people, one of which is a woman, to represent them and 
they are the community leaders. We want to establish self management in the 
camp, meaning that the refugees organized themselves and become responsible 
for life in the camp - safety, health, water, sanitation, recreation, women's issues 
etc. all run by refugee committees.200 
The community-oriented structure and consensus-based decision-making process stand in 
marked contrast to the efficiency-driven and hierarchical NATO military camps. 
 Before these barrack-style refugee camps could even be an issue, Kosovar refugees had 
to be convinced to relocate from Albania’s border areas and then be transported to the new 
camps. Both tasks proved difficult. In mid-April, the UNHCR launched an information campaign 
to explain to refugees the reasons they needed to move to camps in other parts of Albania.201 In 
mid-May, AFOR flew refugees from Kukës to Camp Hope for a “go-and-see visit.”202 The 
United Kingdom was particularly active in the relocation information campaign, donating 
$26,000 to the UNHCR to support this and other information activities related to Kosovo.203 
Refugees, however, were often reluctant to leave for yet another unfamiliar location and 
relocation efforts continued up until the end of Operation Allied Force in June. 
 Moving large numbers of Kosovar refugees from the boarder regions to camps spread 
across Albania posed an entirely different type of challenge. Albania’s notoriously bad roads 
were simply not capable of handling large volumes of traffic, particularly not military and 
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humanitarian convoys. The movement of Kosovar refugees therefore involved a mix of private 
cars, buses, military transportation, and helicopters. By mid-April, NATO began moving 3,000 
Kosovar refugees daily from the Kukës region to ten refugee camps established elsewhere in the 
country.204 A few days later with the cooperation of the Albanian government and civilian 
humanitarian agencies that number jumped to 10,000 daily for several weeks.205  
 Feeding the thousands of Kosovar refugees remained a daily challenge, both logistically 
and financially throughout the crisis. In several camps established and managed by the German 
and Italian militaries, Kosovar refugees were treated to “three hot meals a day and hot showers.” 
In contrast, the U.S. military handed out MREs once daily to refugees.206 Similarly, while 600 
Italian soldiers built and managed a single camp, “a handful” of UNHCR personnel later 
managed the very same camp. The luxuries Kosovar refugees temporarily enjoyed in some 
NATO-run camps caused very real problems in the eventual transition to management by 
civilian humanitarian agencies. During the crisis Karen Koning Abuzayd, the regional 
representative for the UNHCR, argued that the high standard of living provided by some of 
NATO’s member-states “has been another one of the problems we face when NGOs take over. 
None of us can quite keep up with this standard” of living.207 
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Civilians to the Fore 
 The transition from NATO-led relief efforts to civilian coordination was anything but 
smooth. By mid-April civilian humanitarian agencies finally had their feet under them and were 
anxious to take the initiative from NATO. No one, however, was really sure how, or if, this 
should be accomplished. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration Julia Taft warned Congress on April 14, 
The issue that we have there is what do we want NATO to do, what do we want 
the host country security forces to do, police forces to do, and what do we want 
the UN system and NGO's to do. And these are starting to get mixed up.208 
For good or ill, NATO had established the initial infrastructure to cope with the Kosovar 
refugees largely without the assistance of the UNHCR and only secondary level help from other 
humanitarian agencies. The challenge became how to reinsert these agencies into the 
management and leadership of refugee assistance. Taft captured the crux of the challenge when 
she explained that to make sure “there is no gap and there is no precipitous handover” from 
NATO’s “incredible job in doing these camps virtually overnight” required “a lot more 
involvement of the UN to help that happen.”209 
 The transfer to civilian leadership, as with the rest of the Kosovar refugee crisis, was 
complicated by the large number of individuals, states, and organizations involved. Just as the 
militaries of each NATO member-state set up refugee camps largely independently, they handled 
the transfer to civilian leadership independently. For example, United States Department of State 
Assistant Secretary Julia Taft and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration worked 
closely with the UNHCR throughout the crisis, including the handover process. Through this 	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working relationship, which existed prior to the Kosovar refugee crisis, the United States 
military handed over control of its camps to the UNHCR. Many other NATO member-states, 
however, made arrangements with other civilian humanitarian organizations, often based in their 
own country, to take over the management of the refugee camps. In addition, it became common 
for separate civilian humanitarian organizations to take over the running of specific tasks at 
camps, rather than an entire camp. Here the UNHCR and other more traditional humanitarian 
organizations came into conflict with newer and typically smaller organizations over power 
dynamics and proper roles during and after the transition from military leadership. As Taft 
eloquently framed it at a Senate hearing, “We can’t go around this region having an Italian camp 
here, a USA camp here. I mean, this is not rational.”210 
 
 
An Unexpected End 
 The end of the Kosovar refugee crisis continued the pattern of unusualness and extremes. 
On June 10, Milošović agreed to NATO’s terms and signed the Military Technical Agreement. 
Historically, refugee repatriation is a slow process in which the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
agencies slowly convince and prod refugees into returning; not so in Kosovo. A month and a half 
after the end of the bombing campaign, however, the UNHCR reported that “more than 95% of 
Kosovar refugees had left” Albania.211 This “rapid” and “unpredictable” repatriation occurred 
not at the behest of the UNHCR, but was “self-initiated” by the Kosovar refugees. In fact, NATO 
and humanitarian agencies agreed that it was still unsafe for Kosovar refugees to go back to their 
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homes, concerned with the possibilities of “land mines and booby traps in destroyed houses and 
transport routes.”212 Not only was this mass repatriation unprecedented in scope and speed, but 
its reason was unexpected as well. Kosovar refugees were explicit in their belief that NATO 
would protect them. Hossein Sarem-Kalali, theUNHCR Senior Shelter Site Planning Coordinator 
observed, “the deployment into Kosovo of the NATO-led Kosovo Force prompted the 
spontaneous repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees from Albania to Kosovo.”213 In fact, 
Kosovar refugees were eager to return to Kosovo, so much so that at the Morini border crossing 
they queued for over three hours in the blistering July heat. The UNHCR became so concerned 
over the risk of sunstroke and dehydration that they scrambled resources to distribute water to 
the most vulnerable of waiting refugees.214  
 The return of Albanian Kosovar refugees sparked a second refugee crisis. The United 
States Congressional Situation Report for June 17 warned, “Some roads in Kosovo are clogged 
with a two-way refugee flow: thousands of ethnic Albanians are returning to Kosovo from 
refugee camps despite safety concerns, and Kosovo Serbs are fleeing for fear of revenge 
attacks.”215 Some of these post-bombing refugees stayed in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
joining other internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Serbia and Montenegro. Others found shelter 
in refugee camps recently deserted by ethnic Albanian refugees. Here, NATO’s pro-Albanian 	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bias, and the assumed complacency of humanitarian agencies, put relief efforts at a decided 
disadvantage. A year after NATO’s intervention, U.S. Ambassador James Pardew reported on a 
“pilot project to return Serbs to Kosovo,” but warned that ethnic Serbs in and out of Kosovo 
remained “reluctant partners” in cooperation efforts with both OSCE and UNMIK.216  
 Meanwhile in Albania, civilian humanitarian organizations were left with the arduous 
task of dismantling the refugee camps scattered across the country. The unexpected mass return 
of Kosovar refugees forestalled the complete handover from military to civilian led refugee 
assistance efforts, which complicated the process. In fact, at the end of June, NATO was still 
working on scheduling the handover of several camps to civilian humanitarian organizations.217 
The camp rehabilitation responsibilities of NATO and civilian humanitarian agencies were, at 
least in theory, agreed upon when the camps were established. Many civilian humanitarian 
agencies, however, “left without taking appropriate measures relating to camp cleaning and 
rehabilitation of campsite,” leaving the UNHCR to clean up.218 Closing the refugee camps 
involved the dismantling of structures, removal of equipment, and returning the land to its 
original state. For example, at a UNHCR-managed camp near Kukës, the UNHCR had to remove 
gravel, level the land, and then plough it to ready it for agriculture.219 In several cases, closing 
the refugee camps was complicated by looting by local Albanians. For example, the Malteser 
Camp was looted in early July. The site had been picked so clean that UNHCR worker Terry 	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Lustig reported that “there was little evidence that the camp had been there.”220 Even more 
impressive is Lustig’s report on a camp in Kukës. He sardonically notes that, “there was no 
looting. Villagers closed the camp by threatening the camp operators with guns.” 
 Closing the last of the empty camps in Albania was anything but the end of competition 
and cooperation between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations. As Kosovar refugees 
flooded back into Kosovo, AFOR shifted gears to provide logistical support to civilian 
humanitarian agencies within Kosovo. In July, AFOR’s logistic efforts focused on assisting the 
World Food Program and UNHCR shift their operations, as well as over 500 tons of 
humanitarian aid supplies, into Kosovo.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 By August 1999, NATO had successfully completed its first humanitarian operation, and 
was well on its way to establishing its second in Kosovo proper. NATO, its member-states, and 
their militaries had responded quickly to a Kosovar refugee crisis that had expanded well beyond 
initial expectations. NATO structures and standing operating procedures established to combat 
the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe were quickly adapted to meet the needs of both 
Operation Allied Force, as well as Kosovar refugee needs in Albania and Macedonia.221 
Likewise, the funding structure of NATO in which each member-state bears the cost of its own 
operations proved effective, at least as far as NATO’s own operations were concerned. Far more 
importantly, NATO demonstrated that a military alliance could successfully and quickly meet 
the basic needs of refugees. While some of NATO’s efforts might not have conformed to 
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international humanitarian standards, the absolute faith that Kosovar refugees placed in NATO 
by the end of the crisis speaks profoundly to NATO’s capacity to perform humanitarian 
operations. 
 NATO and many of its member-states, however, lacked experience with humanitarian 
operations. The challenges that resulted from learning as they went were exacerbated by the 
absence of a strong initial UNHCR presence. The closest parallel to the events in 1999 is 
Operation Provide Comfort in 1991. Immediately following the success of the 1990 Gulf War, 
fought by a coalition that included many NATO member-states, a group of ethnic Kurds in 
northern Iraq rebelled against Saddam Hussein and were brutally suppressed, resulting in large 
numbers of refugees and a humanitarian disaster. The United States, with UN approval, 
redeployed Army and Special Forces units from the Arabian theater and Fort Bragg to the 
mountains of northern Iraq to provide emergency relief. The Army built and administered 
Kurdish refugee camps before facilitating the transfer of responsibilities to the UNHCR. The 
Army’s tasks included “the building of shelters and distribution of supplies, ensure order, and 
provide security throughout the area.”222 In addition, the US military provided logistical support 
to the UNHCR and over 40 other civilian humanitarian relief agencies.223 Unlike in the later 
Kosovar refugee crisis, however, the UNHCR directed US military humanitarian efforts from the 
beginning of the crisis. Without the UNHCR or another civilian humanitarian agencies playing a 
coordinating role in 1999, NATO’s member-states acted relatively independently of each other 
and made many avoidable mistakes.  
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 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the dynamics of cooperation and competition 
between NATO and civilian humanitarian organizations were even more complicated in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In Macedonia, preexisting ethnic tensions between 
ethnic Albanians, Serbs, and Macedonians further complicated the Kosovar refugee crisis. The 
government of Macedonia worried that the sudden influx of more ethnic Albanians would trigger 
a conflict in Macedonia and was therefore reluctant to accept refugees. Although 250,000 
Kosovar refugees entered Macedonia, roughly 96,000 refugees were transferred to either 
Albania, or other countries in Europe or as far away as Australia.224 The added security concerns 
in Macedonia, negotiations with the Macedonian government, and the logistics of transporting 
refugees out of Macedonia created even more complex relationships between NATO and civilian 
humanitarian organizations and a difficult negotiation between international humanitarian norms 
and the reality in Macedonia.  
 While Operation Allied Force may be a textbook example of the American way of war 
preferred by the United States military, NATO’s simultaneous Kosovar refugee assistance efforts 
in Albania support historians’ claims for an alternative American way of war. American forces, 
as well as the military forces of other NATO member-states, proved fully capable of performing 
these non-warfighting tasks. Even though most units deployed to Albania lacked previous 
experience or training in peace operations, they were able to adapt. During the Cold War, the UN 
developed a norm against major world powers participating in UN peacekeeping operations. 
Although the aim of this norm was to discourage the spread of the superpower contest, an 
unintended side affect was encouraging amnesia among western militaries with regard to a long 
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tradition of gendarme operations.225 With the end of the Cold War, western militaries began a 
painful process of reincorporating the tradition of “savage wars of peace” into their self-
conceptualizations. Military humanitarianism in NATO’s Kosovar refugee assistance efforts, 
was one stage in this process. The experiences of NATO’s militaries in the Kosovar refugee 
crisis and in later state building in Kosovo itself influenced counterinsurgency strategy and 
military development projects to win the hearts and minds in Afghanistan and Iraq 
 After the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, militaries, many from NATO member-states, 
were praised for their humanitarian relief efforts. If civilian humanitarian organizations welcome 
military assistance in responding to natural disasters, why are they leery of accepting a military 
role in disasters resulting from war? In addition to challenging views of appropriate military 
roles commonly held by civilian humanitarian organizations, NATO’s assistance to Kosovar 
refugees in Albania also challenges views militaries hold about themselves. Examining the 
Kosovar refugee crisis in 1999 begins to tackle the broader issue of why western militaries 
became more involved in humanitarian operations, how they went about it, and the implications 
for military cultures and roles. 
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